很多時候在一些有關大陸工人的請願示威都會看見韓東方, 一般他只會默默地派傳單, 過去十多年, 他一直在香港, 回不了大陸亦不願到國外, 他的中國勞動通訊一直都在發放有關中國的工人示威抗議活動.
以下是他於 new left review 的訪問, 我節錄了關於他近年工作的部份, 整個訪問請到 new left review
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What about your radio programme, Labour Express?
I started doing a programme on Radio Free Asia in March 1997, shortly before the handover of Hong Kong by the British to the
prc.
They gave me airtime twice a week to comment on Chinese labour matters;
but after a few months of this—at the end of 1997—I told them I
couldn’t continue to talk about Chinese workers without talking to
them. I was losing touch, my ideas were drying up. I suggested I give
out a telephone number so that my audience could call toll-free. Sure
enough, people began to call in. I would ask those ringing from home to
call again from a public phone, and then I would return the call. Those
ringing after office hours would leave messages—when we arrived in the
mornings we would find the tape full. My writings really benefited as a
result of this dialogue with my radio listeners—my articles became much
more down-to-earth and concrete. I then realized that all these
conversations should really be brought into the open, and decided we
should put them on the air, provided the callers agreed. I began to get
more and more phone calls, and people were very willing to talk. To
begin with we used software to alter callers’ voices so they couldn’t
be recognized, because I didn’t want to get them into trouble. But they
increasingly said, ‘No, I don’t want my voice changed! I want to speak
the truth.’
Then
we began to cover demonstrations and strikes, not after the fact, but
as current news stories. I would produce a report including interviews
with workers, government officials, trade unions, management and so on.
For example, in 1998 there were a number of disputes over back pay, and
the treatment of retired and off-post workers. There were protests in
the street, and I would receive a call from a public phone in front of
a government building, telling me there were five hundred people there.
So I would phone back, and interview people at the other end of the
line, asking them about their problems and their lives. It was
extraordinary—like having a reporter on the scene, recording the news
live. Then I would call local government officials, and ask what they
were going to do, and why the situation was getting worse and worse.
And I would ask the trade union officials what they were doing for the
workers—and they would reply that they were trying to calm them down
and send them home, because workers didn’t understand the difficulties
that management and government faced, and so on.
Were the calls you were getting coming from any regions in
particular—for example, were they mainly concentrated along the coast?
No,
they came from everywhere—even Tibet and Xinjiang. The distribution of
the calls has depended more on the period than on the region, in
particular on the timing of the reforms of state enterprises in any
given part of the country. Around 1998–99 there were a lot of off-post
protests in Heilongjiang, Gansu and Guizhou, for example, and stoppages
of trains in the coalmine areas of Sichuan.
Are people able to listen to the programme all over China?
It
depends on the area—sometimes the signal is jammed, and people call and
complain. They can’t believe the Americans, with all their technology,
can’t get around the jamming, which is done by local radio stations
where the army is involved. Basically, they just broadcast alternative
programmes over the same frequency, operas and the like.
Has the element of fear diminished since you started this kind of reporting?
Yes, people’s fear is disappearing. The reason, in my view, is that anger is growing, and eclipsing fear.
How would you say your ideas have developed as a result of the radio programme and the Bulletin?
I’ve
learnt a great deal. By talking to so many different people I have been
forced to become more realistic, and think in increasingly concrete
terms about how to resolve problems. It was very difficult in the
beginning, but I developed an ability to get a general picture of a
factory by talking to different workers, managers and government
officials. Then I realized that though I could comment on these things,
I could not provide solutions—firstly because I was unable to, and
secondly because no one had voted for me. I did not represent anyone.
To
start with, when I put together reports on demonstrations and talked to
various officials, I would try to force them to respond to my
questions, to which they would give stupid answers that highlighted the
sickness of the system. I would get quite excited about our success in
doing this. But after a while I realized that activity of this kind
doesn’t actually help resolve any of the problems in the factory. The
question of back pay, for example, is dependent on the budget of the
enterprise; if the money isn’t there, I could be sitting in the
official’s chair without any better solution myself. I felt then that
workers should try to resolve disputes in a peaceful and rational way,
by negotiation. If nine months of back pay are owed, and the government
can only pay for three, there’s no point standing in the street until
the full sum is paid; you negotiate and get them to pay three months,
say, and the rest in nine months’ time. But then I realized that,
without a legal basis for the negotiations, there is nothing to hold
the government to its promises.
So
we developed a form of struggle which involved encouraging workers to
file lawsuits. The law is very clear on the government’s responsibility
to pay workers’ salaries; not only is the Ministry of Labour obliged to
disburse back pay, it must also pay a fine for letting arrears build
up. Since about two and a half years ago, the Bulletin has been
actively intervening in such cases. We no longer observe from the
sidelines, we explain the legal procedures to workers, and find lawyers
willing to take their cases. Two years ago, some ten workers from a
huge textile factory in Suizhou, in the province of Hubei, were
arrested after a demonstration. We got them a lawyer from Beijing,
whereupon the charges were dropped and the authorities sent them
directly to a re-education centre without trial. So we went to the
local Public Security Bureau with the lawyer, insisting that this was
an illegal administrative decision, and they released the workers. It
was a very effective intervention. After this, we developed a ‘law case
intervention programme’, which has been very productive so far. More
and more lawyers are willing to work with us directly, they don’t feel
the need to hide themselves at all—they are making money from it, in
professional fashion.
So far you’ve spoken about state enterprises. What about disputes in the private sector?
The
private sector can be divided into two parts: domestic and foreign
enterprises. It’s much easier to deal with foreign firms than with
Chinese. Local companies mostly consist of privatized former
state-owned enterprises, whose current owners are former managers or
officials, cutting local officials in on their profits. So in cases
like these, one is still up against local government functionaries, who
are very protected. With foreign factories—including those owned by
Taiwanese, Hong Kong and Korean investors—the owners of course pay off
local officials, but you can push these officials into a corner by
pointing to the labour law and telling them they are protecting foreign
investors at the expense of Chinese workers. It’s much easier to apply
pressure by making this kind of argument.
I’ve
also realized it’s easier for workers in foreign factories to launch
actions. They often come from the countryside, and have never been
taken care of by anybody. In former state-owned enterprises, many
workers stayed on after privatization, even at dramatically reduced
wages. Yet many of them still feel as if the state should somehow take
care of them. The belief is residual, but it’s enough to stifle their
independence—they don’t want to burn their bridges by doing anything
drastic on their own. Years ago, for example, the government was going
to close down a factory. We encouraged the workers to take legal action
and organize, but they didn’t want to. Many of them were scared, and
willing to accept less favourable terms. Most lost everything, and even
those who kept their jobs are working in far worse conditions. Now
they’re eager to fight, but it’s too late. The platform for building
solidarity has been lost—where you had, say, five thousand workers
before, now you have only three hundred. All this makes organizing in
former state-owned enterprises a disheartening experience. We believe
that workers in foreign factories should be the main target of
organizing for the labour movement in China. Once you get these people
organized, they will influence the privatized state-owned enterprises.
You mentioned back pay. What are the other main issues that arise?
Working conditions? Wages? What about unemployment?
Alas,
we cannot hope to organize the unemployed. Often workers contact me
complaining in advance about an unfair dismissal. I encourage them time
and again to file a lawsuit, but they refuse, preferring to petition
the authorities—again and again, until they formally lose their job. By
that time it is too late, because there is no legal record to show that
they did not consent to their dismissal. This sort of thing is
especially upsetting, because these people are the poorest of all,
those who need help most. Against our will, we are forced to choose
particular points of entry, if we hope to build a movement. We don’t
see China Bulletin as a service centre—though we will of course help
with individual cases where we can. We see ourselves as creators of a
labour movement, and believe that workers’ protection in future depends
on whether we can successfully create a strong one. So we have to make
painful choices—to drop one case and continue with another, if the
second looks as if it could develop into a collective issue, in which
workers might select representatives who could eventually develop into
trade union leaders. For it is through these legal struggles that they
can be encouraged to form a union in their factory. Once there are
elected union representatives, we are one step further towards
reforming the official trade union, which we do not want to get rid of,
since we see it as a useful shell. It has to be changed internally,
with increased worker participation. At factory level, once you have
members pushing for elections, impeaching irresponsible officials,
bringing lawsuits, so many things become possible. We offer legal
education to workers, telling them how to organize a union, helping
them with election procedure, producing membership cards, keeping
contact with people.
At
the same time, because we do everything on a solid legal basis, the
local Public Security Police can’t do much to these workers. We explain
to the workers that we are helping them because of their labour
disputes, and that we wish to solve them for the good of everyone. So
if the police ask them if we have a hidden agenda, there’s nothing
anyone can say against us. Recently, there was a 49-day strike in a
textile factory in Xianyang in Shaanxi. Most of the workers were women.
I drafted election procedures for them, highlights of the trade union
and labour laws, and offered to find a lawyer for them in Beijing. Then
the leaders were arrested. On the one hand, I was reasonably sure they
would not be treated like the workers in Liaoyang. On the other hand I
thought, my God, I have effectively sent these people to prison. Three
months later, they were released. After this, we learnt to stay focused
on the most down-to-earth labour disputes and concrete issues. The
Xianyang factory was bought by a Hong Kong-listed company, with a state
background, called China Resource. They promised the workers nothing
would change, and that everyone would get long-term contracts. But as
soon as the deal was done, the workers were told that the longest
contract available would be for three years, and that everyone was on
six months’ probation. Extremely skilled workers who had been in the
same job for 20 years were now on probation, and receiving only 60 per
cent of their previous salary. That’s why they began to protest—they
locked the factory gates and completely stopped production. Today, they
are still working. They have not been laid off.
Just
recently I received an email from a primary school teacher employed at
a coal mine in Jilin, writing on behalf of thousands of miners. He said
he had read one of my articles on the internet, and absolutely agreed
about the need to organize the workers, so he had downloaded the
article, printed it out and circulated it among the miners. They were
very excited about the idea of getting organized legally, but wanted my
help because they didn’t know the correct procedure. These are the
sorts of cases I want to focus on, which need to be dealt with
extremely carefully. People in China experienced the Cultural
Revolution, June 4th, and then after June 4th came darkness; they are
very afraid, but cannot explain why
they are afraid. I believe the worst fear is felt when you can’t
understand it or find a reason for it. Once you know the reason, you
can deal with it. By giving legal assistance to the workers, we’re
making it very clear that there is no reason to be scared, that for
everything they are asking for there is hope.
Would it be accurate to say that all branches, wherever one looks, of
the official trade union are acting on behalf of the management, rather
than for the workers?
Yes, this is absolutely true, and it applies everywhere. In most cases, the trade-union functionaries themselves are also
part of the management.
Is your strategy to get workers to be sufficiently self-confident to
vote these people out of office, and insist on having real
representatives?
I
used to think that, but I view it as impossible so long as people are
afraid. Also, I don’t know the technical procedure. Furthermore, even
when I’ve talked to workers about labour law, trade union law and so
on, they would still rather concentrate on specific cases than on trade
union elections. I have to convince them that a union election is
closely connected to their case, to make it more legitimate. But we do
believe that if there are more workers in the factory organizing
elections, there will be real pressure on this trade union system—if
you don’t represent these workers, they will kick you out of office.
Even the best people in the present machinery, who have genuine
sympathy for the fate of their workers, have never been trained to
organize anything. They have no idea how to represent the workers. So
far as lawsuits go, on the other hand, the most important thing is that
they build self-confidence. If you have collective self-confidence,
it’s fine to make mistakes with procedure, you can correct them, learn
and move on. But if you don’t have self-confidence, you won’t even
begin. This is why providing legal guidance and lawyers is so helpful
to these workers—they’ve finally found solid ground to walk on.
The implication of what you’re saying is that the workers can have confidence in the courts.
If you have enough workers together, you make it more difficult for the courts to make decisions that go against the country’s
own laws—which of course they are fully capable of doing.
Are there cases in which workers try to strike for higher wages? This
would be a normal thing elsewhere.
It
is happening more and more now. There are virtually daily strikes in
the Shenzhen area. These are strikes for shorter working hours, higher
wages, better working conditions. But this is the nature of the working
class—they will wake up by themselves, whether or not the China
Bulletin is there. All we can do is to make the journey to collective
self-confidence shorter, and one for which workers will pay less of a
price, avoiding desperate struggles that they can only lose.
Are the people who get in touch with you mostly elderly or younger workers?
A
mixture. It depends on where they work. In former state-owned
enterprises, it’s mostly older people, who are not yet retired—around
40 or 50 years old. They still need their jobs, and now want to fight,
but don’t know how. At the moment we are focusing on foreign factories,
especially in the Shenzhen and Guangdong areas, on cases of
work-related disease. In struggles over wages, it can sound like you’re
asking for more than the basic; but here, where people have contracted
diseases because of bad working conditions, you’re asking for well
below the basic. For this reason, when we hold the local labour bureau
to account, we get a lot of sympathy from reporters, lawyers, judges,
even government officials responsible for other areas. It’s through
cases like these that we can explain everything—freedom of association,
collective bargaining, labour and trade union law, respect for basic
human rights—analysing everything in concrete terms. It’s because we go
through the legal system that no one can be against these workers. If
we can persist, we could make ourselves indestructible.
Your strategy wagers everything on legal actions, of a defensive
character, to build collective self-confidence. But don’t ordinary
people in China, both workers and peasants, employed and unemployed,
feel passionately about issues of social justice, just as strongly as
about legal justice, if not more so? There is massively growing
economic inequality, seizures of peasant land, huge enrichment of
corrupt officials, businessmen and yuppies. How can one realistically
expect the anger this causes not to lead to popular explosions outside,
and against, the highly repressive laws of the land? Would you tell
people they must keep quiet and suffer the status quo, when their
indignation boils over?
It
is correct that ordinary people in China now feel no less strongly
about social justice than about legal justice. However, our approach
does not mean that our understanding of the one precludes the other. In
China’s modern history, efforts to solve social problems by social
means have occurred again and again, in a cyclical pattern. This is not
just something that has happened in the past—it is very much present at
the moment. In other words, it does not require anyone to push or to
mobilize for it to take place. It happens all the time without special
mobilization. The contribution that we can make at the China Labour
Bulletin is to offer another line of thinking, that differs from the
tradition of uprisings, armed struggles, revolutions.
Our
approach is to offer more options to ordinary Chinese people when there
is an explosive social problem. Will you put your trust in gathering
tens of thousands of people onto the streets, or in seeking legal help
from a lawyer? Most Chinese people believe in the former rather than
the latter. It’s not just part of our modern history. It’s very much in
the blood of our reality today or even tomorrow. So there is no need
for us to work on it. What China has historically lacked is a fair
legal system and the rule of law. Efforts to create these have never
yet succeeded. This is what we are trying to do—to solve existing
social problems through existing legal systems. In a sense, you could
call it a cultural project: encouraging people to trust in peaceful
negotiations. That kind of confidence is needed for a healthier
development of the country in the future. When people speak of
‘sustainable development’, it must also mean a society where the
government is restricted by laws, and cannot abuse its power with
impunity. Meanwhile, citizens have to learn the skills to negotiate for
their own benefit, as well as to use legal leverage to fight for their
civil rights.
These
are all means that lie outside the ‘old’ modern Chinese conception of
social revolution. Unfortunately, they have not yet taken root in
contemporary China. But we have to try to develop them. To speak
pessimistically, this is to work when you know it is almost unworkable.
It’s to make an effort. To be sure, I will never criticize or try to
stop ordinary people in China when they take to the streets to protest
against social injustice. I have no objection to mass protests and no
obligation to defend the ccp’s version of ‘social stability’. However, I will not encourage people to take to the streets, either. Whenever there is an
opportunity, I try to point out the other options.