Honestly, China – Fragile Superpower caught my attention as well as curiosity. How fragile is China? This is my very first question before reading the book. The poor rural peasants, increasing laid-off workers, the rise of civil and democratic consciousness among Chinese citizens, the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)…? I have thought about various reasons for a fragile China.
Unexpectedly, a “fragile China” is not the comment or viewpoint from the west, but from the Chinese president Hu Jintao, “although China looks like a powerhouse from the outside, to its leaders it looks fragile, poor and overwhelmed by internal problems”. Indeed, everyone knows that the Chinese leaders are facing numerous internal problems, apart from dealing with poor peasants and laid-off workers, environmental degradation, the Chinese product safety, the gap between the rich and the poor as well as the income gap between coastal and inland are also the imminent challenges to the rise of China.
Susan L. Shirk is the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in managing US-China relations. She has another perspective towards a “fragile China” – the rise of internet and mass media. The whole threatening mechanism begins with the young “netizens”. The “netizens” search the foreign website in getting the uncensored international news and post it to the local forums. Other “netizens” start to discuss the issue and post some radical responses like protesting the Japanese prime minister’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. Shirk also studies the similar cases such as the US bombardment on Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, the clash of aircraft between China and the US near South China Sea in 2001 and the provocative issue such as Taiwan. Since the Chinese leaders seek to get the collective consensus (to avoid personal responsibility) before formally reacting to international crisis, their replies always come late. In the meantime, the Chinese leaders cannot control the spreading news, especially those from the internet. In order to remain the legitimacy of the government, the Chinese leaders are forced to address according to the public opinion. This is the reason why China reacts toughly towards Japan, the United States and Taiwan even though the Chinese leaders treasure the economic interdependences between China, Japan and the United States as well as the positive image of mainland China among Taiwanese.
Besides, by interviewing some Chinese military generals, Shirk finds that the Chinese leaders have compromised to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) for regime security. Some PLA generals heavily criticized Jiang Zemin’s leadership in dealing with foreign countries. For example, Jiang is regarded as too pro-American, too soft on Japan while too optimistic towards the unification of Taiwan. To pacify the discontents among the PLA generals, Jiang enlarged the PLA’s budget with an increase of double digit percentage annually. Not surprisingly, the west believes that the rise of Chinese military power is a potential threat to the Asia-Pacific region, not because of the modernization of the PLA, but for the growing influence of the Chinese military generals who are not accountable to the civilian government.
Therefore, according to Shirk, China is a fragile superpower because there are too many constrains on the Chinese leaders in making both their domestic and foreign policy. Even worse, as Shirk writes, “The CCP’s ability to control the information that reaches the public is declining at the same time as the country’s military capabilities are improving. And these two trends combine dangerously to intensify the pressure to use force to defend China’s honor”.
Though Shirk develops a model in explaining the dilemmas of the Chinese leaders in facing the demands of public opinion and the belligerence of military generals, it seems that the role of the internet in China is a bit exaggerated. In fact, many foreign websites are blocked in China. Even though there are limited occasional cases which the “netizens” posted uncensored news on local website, these news were removed within hours. There is a doubt whether a concrete public opinion can be formed within a few hours via internet. Shirk also admits that the huge Chinese demonstration against the US for the bombardment of Belgrade in 1999 and the clash of Chinese and American aircrafts in 2001 were acquiesced if not encouraged by the Chinese government. The Chinese government kept the demonstrations under control in order to get better bargaining position over the US. However, Shirk should also take into account that there was a call up of anti-Japanese demonstration in April 2005 on the internet for the Japanese prime minister Kozumi's visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. But this time, the Chinese government firmly prohibited the demonstration since the previous anti-Japanese demonstrations went radically by attacking the Japanese stores. Also, the Chinese leaders want to send a signal to Japan that China is willing to restore their bilateral relations. The point here is that no demonstration can be appeared without the consent of the Chinese government, no matter the demonstration is called up through the internet or not. Besides, Shirk believes that the CCP will stand firm towards Japan, Taiwan and the US because the Qing and the Kuomintang government lost their regime for failing to expel foreign aggressions. It is indeed too early to justify whether the ordinary Chinese will overthrow the CCP only because of its soft stance towards Japan, Taiwan and the US, given that the situation is not the same for the CCP now when compare the previous regimes.
China is a fragile rising power, but its fragility lies on the peasants who have no land to farm and the laid-off workers who have no social security net to rely on rather than the public opinion on the internet.